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Abstract—The IEEE 802.22 standard is the first proposed
standard for the cognitive radio networks in which a set of base
stations (BSs) make opportunistic spectrum access to provide
wireless access to the customer-premise equipments (CPE) within
their cells in wireless regional area networks (WRAN). The
channel assignment and power control must be carried out in
BSs and CPEs, such that no excessive interference is caused to
the users of the primary network. We use a game-theoretic model
to analyze the non-cooperative behavior of the secondary users
in IEEE 802.22 networks. We first show the existence of Nash
equilibrium in a 2-cell non-cooperative game model, where the
players (BSs) want to increase their coverage range. Then we
extend our game to an N-player non-cooperative game where
the players aim at maximizing the number of subscribers (i.e.,
CPEs). We conclude that the non-cooperative behavior of the
players might result in a small number of supported CPEs and
this can be solved by cooperative techniques, such as the Nash
bargaining solution. Numerical results show that our proposed
Nash bargaining solution can significantly increase the efficiency
of the opportunistic spectrum allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The traditional solution for the spectrum management of
wireless networks is to let government agencies, such as
the FCC in the USA, allocate communication frequencies
to different wireless networks. The main problem with this
approach is that the licenses are typically established for long
periods of time. Recent performance studies have shown that
this significantly affects efficiency [18], [19].
Cognitive radio [1], [9] (CR) is an emerging technology that
enables devices to determine which part of the frequencies are
unused, and to use them even if they are licensed to others.
Cognitive radio devices can adapt to the actual frequency
utilization and consequently increase the efficiency of wire-
less communications. One fundamental requirement of these
devices is that they should not hamper the communication
of the primary users, who obtained the license for the given
frequency band.
Recently, there have been efforts to develop cognitive ra-
dios [2], [3], [20], [21] and the government agencies recognize
these devices as a potential solution to increase the spectrum
efficiency. For example, the FCC issued a Report and Order
in 2004: it said that a radio spectrum allocated to TV but
unused in a particular broadcast market can be used by cog-
nitive radios as secondary users. In parallel, the IEEE 802.22
working group develops a standard for a cognitive radio-based
PHY/MAC/Air Interface for use by license-exempt devices on
a non-interfering basis in spectrum that is allocated to the
TV broadcast service [16]. One of the main problems of this
new standard is the channel/power allocation among cognitive
radios.1 Many researchers are currently engaged in designing
efficient protocols for channel/power allocation in these net-
works. They use several techniques, such as graph coloring
and linear integer programming, which are appropriate for
studying the behavior of this new networking environment.
In this paper we use game theory, a useful tool to study
the strategic behavior of network participants (i.e., secondary
BSs and CPEs) in IEEE 802.22. We believe our paper to be
one of the first steps towards a deeper understanding of the
non-cooperative/selfish behaviors of IEEE 802.22 cognitive
radios and we present some important criteria that should
be considered for designing more efficient channel/power
allocation schemes.
Our contributions in this paper are summarized as follows.
First, we analyze the non-cooperative behavior of CRs in IEEE
802.22 environment with a simple 2-player non-cooperative
game. We obtain the socially optimum Nash equilibrium of
this game. We discuss the parameters (e.g., the distance of
the primary user to CRs and BSs) that change the results
of the power game between secondary users in this 2-cell
network. Then we focus on the generalized model of chan-
nel and power allocation and we present the result of this
allocation by using a game-theoretic framework. We show
that the non-cooperative channel/power allocation may lead
to poor performances (bad equilibria), where the secondary
network cannot support many CPEs. Finally, we propose a
cooperative scheme using the Nash bargaining solution (NBS)
that significantly increases the performance of the IEEE 802.22
networks, avoiding the worst-case equilibria of channel/power
allocation game.
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following
way. In Section II, we present a brief review of the literature
on spectrum sharing game. In Section III, we introduce IEEE
802.22 protocol. In Section IV, we describe the system model
and the operational requirements. The game model and the
results of a non-cooperative game in a 2-cell scenario are
1Note that customer-premise equipments (CPE) are the cognitive radios
(CR) stations in IEEE 802.22 parlance. We use the two terms interchangeably
in this paper.
presented in Section V, followed by a generalized game model
of channel/power allocation in Section VI. Finally, we propose
a cooperative scheme using the Nash bargaining solution in
Section VII. We conclude the paper in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
A brief description of several research contributions in
the area of spectrum sharing games can be found in [13].
Halldorsson et al. study channel allocation strategies for Wi-
Fi operators in [8]. They use the maximum graph coloring
problem to identify Nash equilibria and they also provide a
bound on the price of the anarchy of these equilibria. They
also propose several local bargaining schemes to decrease
the price of anarchy. But our solution is based on Nash
bargaining solution and we also consider the power and
channel allocation, simultaneously.
Hoang et al. [10], [11] propose a two-phase channel/power
allocation scheme that improves the system throughput, de-
fined as the total number of subscribers that can be simultane-
ously served. Their solution diverges from ours, because we
consider a game theoretic approach and we analyze coopera-
tive schemes using Nash bargaining.
Felegyhazi and Hubaux [5] consider the competition be-
tween different operators in terms of the pilot power control
of their base stations. They show that in the pilot power control
game a socially desirable Nash equilibrium exists and that it
can be enforced by punishments. But in our game model, the
spectrum belongs to the primary user and the players should
not make interference to the primary user devices.
Game theory is also used in [17] and [7], to analyze the
coexistence of licensed and unlicensed users. In [17], Sen-
gupta et al. present a winner determining sealed-bid knapsack
auction mechanism that dynamically allocates spectrum to the
wireless service providers based on their bids. Finally in [7],
the authors show that a basic auction and market interaction
model based on the Anglo-Dutch split award auction, and
a bargaining approach based on Rubinstein-Stahl bargaining,
would be very suitable for revenue driven spectrum resource
optimization.
III. WIRELESS REGIONAL AREA NETWORK: IEEE 802.22
In this section, we provide a short overview of the IEEE
802.22 standard. Basically, IEEE 802.22 targets the wireless
broadband access in rural and remote areas, utilizing the spec-
trum holes in the allocated TV frequency spectrum without
interfering with any TV channels [4], [16]. It specifies both
the medium access control (MAC) and the physical (PHY)
layers for WRANs. Although nothing has yet been specified
regarding the particular functionalities of the PHY/MAC layers
we know that IEEE 802.22 belongs to the centralized cognitive
radio networks class, where the secondary network is infras-
tructure oriented. In these networks, the area is divided into
cells and each cell is managed by one base station (BS). BSs
can be equipped with a GPS and connected to a centralized
server to obtain the information about the available free TV
channels in the area at the given time. They can also count
on their subscribers (i.e., CPEs) that can sense the channels
regularly and report the available spectrums to the BSs. This
will provide a suitable infrastructure for the future wireless
Internet service providers.
As shown in Fig. 1 (a), IEEE 802.22 works in a point-to-
multipoint basis where each cognitive radio is attached to a
base station. Orthogonal frequency division multiple access
(OFDMA) will be the modulation for uplink and downlink
transmissions in this standard, because it provides an adaptive
and flexible modulation to dynamically adjust the bandwidth.
The frequency range of 54-862 MHz in the USA is a possible
available bandwidth to this protocol. This might be extended to
41-910 MHz for international deployments. Note that by using
one TV channel (i.e, 6, 7, or 8 MHz in different countries)
the approximate maximum bit-rate is 19 Mbit/s at a 30 km
distance. The maximum coverage range of the IEEE 802.22
BSs is expected to be around 100 km. In the next section,
we propose a mathematical model that captures the most
important features of the IEEE 802.22 protocol.
IV. SYSTEM MODEL FOR IEEE 802.22 NETWORKS
We model the IEEE 802.22 network as a centralized cogni-
tive radio network (similar to the model presented in [10]), as
shown in Fig. 1 (b). The available free TV spectrum is divided
into K channels. These channels are licensed to M primary
users (PUs). In the same area, an IEEE 802.22 network is
deployed. We divide the area into L square cells. Within each
cell, there is a base station serving a set of CPEs by using
the spectrum opportunistically. We assume a free-space path-
loss model with a path-loss exponent of α. A complete list of
notations used in this paper is introduced in Table I.
TABLE I
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND DEFINITION IN OUR SYSTEM MODEL.
Symbol Definition
L Number of cells or base stations
M Number of primary users
N Number of cognitive radios
K Number of channels
N0 Noise power spectrum density
Gˆcpi The channel gain from BS serving CRi
to primary user p on channel c
Gcij The channel power gain from the BS serving CRj
to CRi on channel c
P ci The transmit power from BS serving CRi
toward CRi on channel c
Pmax Maximum transmission power on each channel
ζ The interference constraint for each primary user
γ The SINR constraint for each supported CR
A. Operational Requirements
We consider downlink transmission from BSs to CRs. There
are two conditions on power transmission from BSs to CRs.
First, the total interference caused by all BSs to each PU must
be lower than a threshold. Second, for each supported CR the
received signal to interference and noise ratio (SINR) must be
above a threshold.
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Fig. 1. The IEEE 802.22 deployment configuration. (a) An example of deployment of secondary base stations and cognitive radios. (b) Our proposed
cell-based model for IEEE 802.22 networks.
As the spectrum is licensed to PUs, all BSs can use the
spectrum opportunistically, i.e., whenever and wherever it is
possible. We require that, for each PU, the total interference
from all opportunistic transmissions by BSs does not exceed
a predefined threshold ζ, i.e.,
N∑
i=1
P ci Gˆ
c
pi ≤ ζ, ∀p, c (1)
According to the physical model of signal propagation, SINR
at CRi can be expressed as:
γci =
GciiP
c
i
N0 +
∑N
j=1,j 6=iG
c
ijP
c
j
, ∀i, c (2)
For reliable transmission toward CRi, we require that
γci ≥ γ. (3)
where γ is a predefined threshold. γ can be the minimum
SINR required to achieve an acceptable bit error rate at CRs.
According to [10], the problem of finding the optimal
channel/power allocation can be formulated as a linear mixed
integer programming. As solving this problem for the optimal
solution is an NP-hard problem, the authors present a heuristic
scheme based on dynamic interference graph.
But in this paper, the game theory approach is proposed and
examined in order to evaluate the channel/power assignment.
In the next subsection we provide a brief overview of the main
concepts in the game theory that we will use in our evaluations.
B. Game Model
Game theory provides different methods for resource al-
location in a distributed way. Our channel/power allocation
problem can be modeled as a non-cooperative game G, in
which each BS tries to maximize its payoff function. The
strategy of players si, determines the channel allocation and
the assigned power in each channel. Let s be the strategy
profile that is the set of strategies of all players. We assume
that the players share the same strategy set S. ui is the payoff
of player i
In order to gain an insight into the strategic behavior of
the players, we apply the following game-theoretic concepts.
First, let us introduce the concept of best response. We can
write bri(sj), the best response of player i to the opponent’s
strategy sj as follows.
Definition 1: The best response of player i to the profile of
strategies sj is a strategy si such that:
bri(sj) = arg max
si∈S
ui(si, sj) (4)
If two strategies are mutual best responses, then no player has
any motivation to deviate from the given strategy profile. To
identify such strategy profiles in general, Nash introduced the
concept of Nash equilibrium [15]:
Definition 2: The pure-strategy profile s∗ constitutes a Nash
equilibrium if, for each player i,
ui(s∗i , s
∗
j ) ≥ ui(si, s∗j ),∀si ∈ S (5)
where s∗i and s
∗
j are the Nash equilibrium strategies of player
i and j, respectively.
In other words, in a Nash equilibrium, none of the players
can unilaterally change his strategy to increase his payoff.
By carefully designing the payoff function and strategies, the
game can be balanced at a unique socially optimal Nash
equilibrium (NE), where the summation of all payoffs would
be maximized. We introduce such a payoff function in Section
V. In some cases, the non-cooperative behavior may result in
some undesirable Nash equilibria. We examine such a situation
in Section VI. Finally, cooperation game theory introduces
different methods of cooperation among players to improve
the performances of the game. In Section VII, we investigate
one method of cooperation, called Nash bargaining solution.
In this paper, we consider two different cases. First, we
study non-cooperative behavior in a simplified IEEE 802.22
network, composed of two cells and one PU. In this case,
the goal of each BS is to maximize its coverage area. Second,
we study the problem of channel/power allocation in a general
IEEE 802.22 network. The payoff of each BS is the number of
supported CRs within the cell. We study both non-cooperative
and cooperative behaviors in this case.
V. 2-CELL NON-COOPERATIVE GAME
In this section, we develop a distributed game approach to
adaptively assign power in a 2-cell IEEE 802.22 network. The
goal is to maximize the coverage range under the constraint
of the desirable SINR and the protection of primary user.
We consider a 2-cell network (i.e., L = 2), as shown in
Fig. 2. The number of available channels is one (i.e, K = 1).
There is only one PU in the area. We model the problem
as a two-player, non-cooperative game. The players of the
game are the BSs. The strategy of each BS is its transmission
power or equivalently its coverage area. The goal of each
player is to maximize its own payoff. The payoff function
of players depends on two parameters, the coverage range and
the interference caused to the primary user. We consider a
single-stage game, where both players simultaneously choose
their radio range, once and for all. This corresponds to the
case in which the base stations are not able to perform power
control during the operation of the network.
A. Operational Requirements and Feasibility Check
The SINR of a CR located in the first cell (for example,
CR1 in Fig. 2) can be written as:
γ1 =
P1 · d−α11
N0 + P2 · d−α12
(6)
where Pi is the transmission power of BSi. Similarly, the
SINR of a CR located in the second cell (for example, CR2
in Fig. 2) can be written as:
γ2 =
P2 · d−α22
N0 + P1 · d−α21
(7)
If a CR is inside the coverage area of its corresponding BS,
it means that the BS supports it with high enough SINR, i.e.,
γi ≥ γ. Then, at the boundary of the coverage area, we have:
γi = γ
We denote the maximum radio range of BSi by ri. Assume
CR1 and CR2 are located at the boundary of the coverage area
of BS1 and BS2, respectively. From the SINR requirements
(6) and (7), we obtain:
γ =
P1 · r−α1
N0 + P2 · (D − r1)−α (8)
1dp 2
dp 21
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Fig. 2. 2-Cell game model parameters. Two secondary base stations provide
wireless access to CR1 and CR2. The primary user measurement point is
located at distance dp1 and dp2 from BS1 and BS2, respectively.
γ =
P2 · r−α2
N0 + P1 · (D − r2)−α (9)
When a CR is at distance r1 from the first BS, its distance
from the second BS can be any value between D − r1 and
D + r1. A CR located in minimum distance, i.e., D − r1,
experiences the maximum interference from the other BS. So,
if the SINR at this point is equal to γ, we are guaranteed that
the SINR at other points located at distance r1 from the first
BS, will be greater than γ. This is the reason we replaced d12
in Equation (6), by D − r1 in Equation (8) and also d21 in
Equation (7), by D − r2 in Equation (9).
In addition, we require that the total amount of interference
caused by the two BSs to the PU must not exceed a predefined
threshold (ζ), i.e.,
P1 · dp−α1 + P2 · dp−α2 ≤ ζ (10)
Let us address the question of whether there exists positive
P1 and P2 such that Equations (8) and (9) are met. If
r−α1 r
−α
2 − γ2(D − r1)−α(D − r2)−α 6= 0
then, the solution of (8) and (9) will be:
P1 =
γN0(r−α2 + γ(D − r1)−α)
r−α1 r
−α
2 − γ2(D − r1)−α(D − r2)−α
(11)
P2 =
γN0(r−α1 + γ(D − r2)−α)
r−α1 r
−α
2 − γ2(D − r1)−α(D − r2)−α
(12)
Note that the power of a BS (and consequently its coverage
area) depends on the radio range of the other BS. As r1 and r2
are less than D, so the numerator of (11) and (12) are positive.
Consequently, the denominator should be positive in order to
have positive solutions P1 and P2, i.e.,
r−α1 r
−α
2 − γ2(D − r1)−α(D − r2)−α > 0
Or, equivalently:
(
D − r1
r1
)−α · (D − r2
r2
)−α < γ−2 (13)
The above inequality introduces a feasible region for the
coverage area of two BSs. If (13) holds, P1 and P2 can be
calculated from Equation (11) and Equation (12). Furthermore,
P1 and P2 should satisfy (10).
B. 2-Cell Game Model and Results
We define the payoff function of each BS as follows:
ui =
ri
D/
√
2
− Pi · dp
−α
i
ζ
(14)
where ri is the coverage range of BSi, Pi is the transmission
power of BSi, D/
√
2 is the maximum radio range and ζ is
the threshold introduced in (1), i.e., the maximum tolerable
interference caused by two BSs to the PU. The payoff function
is composed of two terms. The positive term represents the
normalized radio range of the BS. The negative term represents
the normalized interference caused by this player to the PU.
We choose the negative term in this way to allow the farther
BS to operate at a higher power and consequently to have a
larger coverage area. By introducing the payoff function in
this way, the objective of each BS will be to maximize its
coverage area, as well as to minimize its interference to the
PU. Let’s replace P1 and P2 calculated in Equation (11) and
Equation (12) in Equation (14):
u1 =
r1
D/
√
2
− γN0dp
−α
1 (r
−α
2 + γ(D − r1)−α)
ζr−α1 r
−α
2 − ζγ2(D − r1)−α(D − r2)−α
(15)
u2 =
r2
D/
√
2
− γN0dp
−α
2 (r
−α
1 + γ(D − r2)−α)
ζr−α1 r
−α
2 − ζγ2(D − r1)−α(D − r2)−α
(16)
We make use of the concept of Nash equilibrium (Defini-
tion 2) to show stability points in the game. We first find the
best response function for each player. Then we identify a set
of strategies for which both players play their best response.
We derive the best response of each player from the payoff
functions presented in Equation (15) and Equation (16).
Lemma 5.1: In the feasible region, the payoff function of
player i is a concave function of ri.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
Concavity means that the derivative of ui with respect to ri
has only one real root. We denote this unique maximizer by
rˆi. rˆi is the best response of player i.
Theorem 5.2: There exists a unique Nash equilibrium for
the 2-Cell game model with the payoff functions defined by
Equation (14).
Proof: Considering Lemma 5.1 the proof is trivial [6].
C. Simulation Results and Discussions
To evaluate the non-cooperative behavior of BSs in a 2-cell
scenario, we set up the simulations. We consider a service area
of 100× 50 km2, which is divided into two square cells. We
assume a path-loss exponent of 4. The noise power spectrum
density is N0 = −100dBm. The required SINR for each CR
is 15dB. The maximum tolerable interference for the PU is
−110dBm.
We obtain the NE of the game by looking at the best
response curves of the two players. In order to obtain the best
response of the first player, we change r2 from zero to the
maximum value. For each r2, we find the best strategy of the
first player (i.e., rˆ1). The best response of the second player
is obtained in a similar way. The NE of the game is the point
of the intersection of the two curves.
In Fig. 3, we consider two different positions of PU. PU
is located at the line connecting the center and the top right
corner of the first cell. We change the location of PU along
this line. So, in this case:
dp2 =
√
D2 + dp21 −
√
2Ddp1
We show the best response curves of the two BSs in Fig. 3 (a),
where PU is near BS1 at dp1 = 15km and in Fig. 3 (b), where
PU is located at dp1 = 35km. As we observe, there exists a
unique NE that is the intersection point of the two curves. We
also observe that the farther BS has a larger coverage range
at the equilibrium point (see the NE point in Fig. 3 (a) where
r2 ' 40km and r1 ' 10km). This behavior is desirable,
because the objective in our problem is to use the spectrum
opportunistically, i.e., whenever and wherever it is possible.
With the payoff function proposed at (14), we allow the farther
BS to use the spectrum in a larger area.
Similar simulation with dp2 =
√
D2 + dp21 +
√
2Ddp1
(i.e., where PU is located at the line connecting the center
and the top left corner of the first cell) shows that when PU
goes farther, both BSs obtain a larger coverage range at the
equilibrium point.
We also look at the sum of the payoff of two players to find
the social optimal strategy profile, where the overall payoff
function is maximized. In Fig. 4, we plot u1 + u2 versus r1
and r2. The maximizer of u1 + u2 is the socially optimum
strategy profile of the game. We observe that the 2-cell non-
cooperative game has a unique social optimal strategy profile.
To summarize our simulation result shows that:
• There exists a unique NE in 2-cell non-cooperative game.
• The BS that is farther from PU gets a larger coverage
area at NE.
• Changing the position of PU forces the BSs to adapt their
coverage area accordingly.
The last two observations show that the 2-cell non-
cooperative game provides BSs a distributed way to make use
of the spectrum opportunistically, i.e., whenever and wherever
it is possible. The above results highlight the properties of
the non-cooperative resource allocation in IEEE 802.22 and
will help us to design efficient mechanisms for channel/power
allocation in these networks. Designing such mechanisms will
be one of our future activities.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 1000
20
40
60
80
100
120
r1 (Km)
r2
(K
m
)
 
 
BR1: dp1 = 15 Km
BR2: dp1 = 15 Km
Nash Equilibrium
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 1000
20
40
60
80
100
120
r1 (Km)
r2
(K
m
)
 
 
BR1: dp1= 35 Km
BR2: dp1= 35 Km
Nash Equilibrium
(a) (b)
Fig. 3. Effect of the location of primary user on the Nash equilibrium of 2-cells non-cooperative game for dp2 =
√
D2 + dp21 −
√
2Ddp1, where (a)
dp1 = 15km and (b) dp1 = 35km.
Fig. 4. Uniqueness of socially optimal strategy profile where dp1 = 35km
and dp2 =
√
D2 + dp21 −
√
2Ddp1.
VI. NON-COOPERATIVE CHANNEL/POWER ALLOCATION
GAME IN IEEE 802.22 NETWORK
In this section, we consider the general problem of chan-
nel/power allocation in IEEE 802.22 networks. We develop a
non-cooperative game to solve the problem in a distributed
way. The objective of the problem is to find the optimal
channel/power assignment, i.e., the assignment that enables
BSs to support the maximum number of CRs. Similar to the
previous game, there are two conditions on power transmission
from BSs to CRs. First, the total interference caused by all BSs
to each PU must be less than a threshold, i.e., Equation (1).
Second, for each supported CR the received SINR must be
above a threshold, i.e., Equation (3).
We model the problem as a L-player non-cooperative game
(recall that L is the number of cells in the network). The
strategy of each player is its power on channels 1, 2, · · · ,K.
We define the payoff of each BS as the total number of
supported CRs (subscribed CPEs) inside its cell. We consider
a single-stage game again; without power control during the
operation of the network.
We also use the iterative water-filling (IWF) algorithm to
find the transmission power vector of BSs in a distributed way.
As explained in [9], we formulate an iterative two-loop water
filling algorithm. The inner loop of IWF finds the transmission
powers in a distributed way. The outer loop adjusts the power
vector to the minimum level needed to satisfy the target SINR
of all CRs. As in this problem, we have the constraint of
protecting PUs, we check this condition after the convergence
of the IWF. The pseudo-code for the IWF that we use is given
in Appendix B.
Different algorithms can be set up to be played among
BSs to reach NE of the channel/power allocation game. One
possible method is given in Appendix C. The performance of
this algorithm is also analyzed through simulations. Here we
are more interested in finding the potential Nash equilibria of
this game and further developments of non-cooperative game
algorithms are beyond the scope of this work.
We use Algorithm 1 to find all possible NE of the chan-
nel/power allocation game. We use two vectors: channel,
power. channel is equal to (ch1, ch2, · · · , chN ), where chi,
i ∈ (1, 2, · · · ,K) denotes the assigned channel to CRi. If
chi = 0, this means that no channel is assigned to CRi. Hence
we are not considering CRi in power allocation. power is
equal to (P1, P2, · · · , PN ), where Pi is the allocated power
to CRi. We use IWF, to calculate power. Note that here we
write Pi instead of P chii for notation abbreviation. We start
with the all zero channel. flag is the indicator of NE. If
flag = 1, channel is NE, otherwise it is not NE. For any
possible channel, we first check if all CRs in one cell are
assigned different channels (OFDMA). If this is not the case,
we simply drop the channel. We then check if chi is the
best response of CRi or not for all is. If all chis are the best
responses, then channel is a NE. Otherwise it is not a NE.
A. Simulation Results and Discussion
We consider one specific deployment of Fig. 1. The size of
the service area is 100 × 100 km2. The area is divided into
4 cells. The total number of CRs is N = 6. We vary M , the
total number of PUs, from 1 to 5. CRs and PUs are randomly
deployed over the area with uniform distribution. For each BS,
the maximum transmission power on each channel is Pmax =
Algorithm 1 Calculation of Nash equilibria in Channel/Power
Allocation Game
1: channel← (0, 0, · · · , 0), flag ← 1
2: for i = 1 : (K + 1)N do
3: if two CRs in one cell has the same channel then
4: flag ← 0, break
5: end if
6: for k = 1 : K do
7: find all CRs with allocated channel k
8: call IWF
9: end for
10: put all outcomes of IWF together and obtain
power = (P1, P2, · · · , PN )
11: for j = 1 : N do
12: if Pj = 0 and by changing chj , Pj can be > 0
then
13: flag ← 0, break
14: end if
15: end for
16: if flag=1 then
17: channel is a NE
18: else
19: not a NE
20: end if
21: channel = channel + 1 mod K, flag ← 1
22: end for
5W . The number of channels is K = 4. Path-loss exponent,
noise power spectrum, required SINR, and maximum tolerable
interference for PU have the same values as in Section V.
Fig. 5 shows the number of NE of the game versus the
number of PUs. As we see, there are many NE in all cases.
We then consider the total number of supported CRs by all BSs
in each NE. Fig. 6 shows the maximum and minimum number
of supported CRs versus the number of PUs at all possible NE.
We observe that when there is only one PU, the maximum and
minimum are equal. This means that in all NE, the number
of supported CRs are the same. So all NE of the game are
optimum. But in other cases, the maximum and minimum of
the supported CRs are different. This shows that out of many
NE, some of them are optimal and some are not. Next we
consider the total transmission power by all BSs in each NE.
Fig. 7 shows the maximum total transmission power versus
the number of PUs. When the number of PUs is increased,
the total transmission power decreases. The reason is that BSs
must fulfill the condition of protecting PUs (Equation (1)).
When more PUs are present in the area, the total transmission
power by all BSs is decreased in order to protect all PUs from
excessive interference.
The above results show that the non-cooperative behavior
in a general scenario, may result in non-convergence or many
undesirable Nash equilibria with few supported CRs. The Nash
bargaining solution (NBS), which requires the cooperation
between BSs, is one method to enhance the performances.
In the next section we study this method.
Fig. 5. Number of NE versus the number of primary users (PU).
Fig. 6. Maximum and minimum number of supported CRs in NE versus the
number of PUs.
VII. NASH BARGAINING FRAMEWORK FOR
CHANNEL/POWER ALLOCATION IN IEEE 802.22
NETWORK
In this section, our approach is significantly different and is
based on the general bargaining theory originally developed
by Nash [14]. Non-cooperative games may lead to substantial
loss to all players, compared to a cooperative strategy where
players can cooperate. The main issue in this case is how to
achieve the cooperation in a stable manner and which Nash
equilibrium can be achieved through cooperation. One possible
solution is Nash bargaining solution.
Fig. 7. Maximum total transmission power of base stations in Nash
equilibrium points versus the number of deployed primary users (PUs).
The underlying structure for a Nash bargaining in an N
players game is a set of outcomes of the bargaining process
S. Bargaining process S is composed of:
1) A set of possible joint strategies or states
2) A designated disagreement outcome d, which represents
the agreement to disagree and solve the problem compet-
itively
3) A multiuser payoff function U : S ∪ {d} → RN
The Nash bargaining is a function F that assigns to each
pair (S ∪ {d}, U) an element of S ∪ {d}. Furthermore, the
Nash solution is unique. In order to obtain the solution, Nash
assumed four axioms: Linearity, Independence of irrelevant
alternatives, Symmetry, and Pareto optimality. Nash proved
that there exists a unique solution to the bargaining problem
satisfying these 4 axioms. The solution is obtained by
s = arg max
s∈S∪{d}
ΠNn=1(Un(s)− Un(d)). (17)
We also define the Nash function F (s) : S ∪ {d} → R:
F (s) = ΠNn=1(Un(s)− Un(d)). (18)
The Nash bargaining solution is obtained by maximizing the
Nash function over all possible states. Since the set of possible
outcomes U(S ∪ {d}) is convex, F(s) has a unique maximum
on the boundary of U(S ∪ {d}). It is common to define
disagreement point for all players i as follows:
d = min
s−i∈S−i
max
si∈Si
ui(si, s−i). (19)
We investigate NBS in our problem. First, BSs find all pos-
sible channel assignments. For each channel assignment, the
corresponding power vector is computed using IWF. Note that
power is still assigned in a distributed way. The payoff of each
BS is the number of supported CRs within the cell. According
to the power vector, the payoff of BSs in each assignment
can be computed. The calculated values can be exchanged
by the BSs over a dedicated communication channel for the
negotiation. Note that there are some ongoing research studies
to assign a worldwide, harmonized, cognitive-supporting pilot
channel with a bandwidth less than 50 kHz [12] to allow such
negotiations.
Then the disagreement point d is adjusted using Equa-
tion (19). Finally, NBS is computed using Equation (17). The
pseudo-code for finding the NBS is given by Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Nash Bargaining Solution
1: find all possible channel assignments
2: find power vector of each channel assignment using IWF
3: find the payoff of BSs in each assignment
4: calculate disagreement point:
d = mins−i∈S−i maxsi∈Si ui(si, s−i)
5: find NBS:
s = arg maxs∈S∪{d}ΠNn=1(Un(s)− Un(d))
We implement NBS in the network of Fig. 1. All param-
eters are set to the values mentioned in Section VI-A. Our
Fig. 8. The number of supported CRs versus the number of PUs, when the
Nash bargaining solution is used.
simulation results show that there exists a unique solution to
the bargaining problem. The outcome of NBS is shown in
Fig. 8. Comparing Fig. 8 and Fig. 6, we note that the NBS
and the optimal NE of the non-cooperative game coincides.
For example, consider the case when the number of PUs is
3. The number of supported CRs at NE points varies between
1 and 4 (see Fig. 6). So, out of all possible NE of the non-
cooperative games, some of them are optimal and some are
not. Whereas in Fig. 8, we observe that when number of PUs is
3, the number of supported CRs as a result of Nash Bargaining
process is 4, which is equal to optimal NE of non-cooperative
game.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the problem of channel/power
allocation in IEEE 802.22 cognitive networks. Using a game-
theoretic framework, we have analyzed the strategic behaviors
of the BSs in these networks. We have derived the optimum
strategies and corresponding parameters for a simple 2-Cell
IEEE 802.22 network. Then, we have shown that a pure non-
cooperative power/channel allocation in IEEE 802.22 network
cannot maximize the number of supported CPEs. We have
proposed a cooperative solution, based on Nash bargaining,
to increase the efficiency of power/channel allocation. The
simulation results show that the bargaining solution avoid the
non-optimal channel/power allocations.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 5.1
Proof: We prove the concavity of ui by showing that its
second derivative is always negative in the feasible region. We
express u1 as:
u1 =
r1
D/
√
2
− γN0dp−α1 ζ−1 ·
X
Y
where
X = r−α2 + γ(D − r1)−α
and
Y = r−α1 r
−α
2 − γ2(D − r1)−α(D − r2)−α
The first derivative of u1 is as follows:
∂u1
∂r1
=
1
D/
√
2
− γN0dp−α1 ·
∂X
∂r1
Y − ∂Y∂r1X
Y 2
The second derivative is:
∂2u1
∂r21
=
−γN0dp−α1 ·
(∂
2X
∂r21
Y − ∂2Y
∂r21
X)Y 2 − 2 ∂Y∂r1Y ( ∂X∂r1Y − ∂Y∂r1X)
Y 4
The first derivative of X is:
∂X
∂r1
= −γα(D − r1)−α−1
Its second derivative is:
∂2X
∂r21
= γα(α+ 1)(D − r1)−α−2
The first derivative of Y is:
∂Y
∂r1
= −αr−α−11 r−α2 − αγ2(D − r1)−α−1(D − r2)−α
Its second derivative is:
∂2Y
∂r21
= α(α+ 1)r−α−21 r
−α
2
−α(α+ 1)γ2(D − r1)−α−2(D − r2)−α
Putting all together and considering the feasible region (13),
we conclude that:
∂2u1
∂r21
< 0
The same reasoning is true for u2. We conclude that ui is a
concave function of ri.
B. Iterative Water Filling Algorithm
The following algorithm shows the iterative water filling
algorithm to find the transmit power vector of BSs in a
distributed way.
Algorithm 3 Iterative Water Filling
1: IWF gets m BSs transmitting towards m CRs and returns
P = (P1, P2, · · · , Pm)
2: P ← (0, 0, · · · , 0)
3: for i = 1 : m do
4: update Pi based on all Pj , j 6= i
5: end for
6: for i = 1 : m do
7: if γ(CRi) > γ then
8: reduce γ
9: end if
10: if γ(CRi) < γ then
11: reduce γ
12: end if
13: end for
14: if all CRs reach γ then
15: goto 19
16: else
17: goto 3
18: end if
19: check the constraint of protecting PUs
20: if not satisfied then
21: P ← (0, 0, · · · , 0)
22: end if
23: return P
C. Non-Cooperative Game
Here, we propose an algorithm to be played among BSs
to reach the NE of the game. The proposed algorithm starts
with a channel assignment which is chosen uniformly at
random out of all possible channel assignments. Then BSs
find the corresponding transmit power by using IWF. If this
channel/power assignment is a NE of the game, the algorithm
finishes. Otherwise it continues in this way: the BS serving
the first CR, assigns the next channel to it. If this assignment
is a NE, the algorithm finishes. Otherwise, the BS serving the
second CR assigns the next channel to it. If this assignment is
a NE, the algorithm finishes. Otherwise, it continues with the
third CR and so on. counter saves the number of iterations
of the algorithm and is increased by one in each step. The
algorithm finishes whenever either it reaches a NE or counter
becomes a predefined maximum value. The pseudo-codes for
this algorithm are given in Fig. 4. Note that by implementing
this algorithm, BSs may converge to any NE from any arbitrary
initial assignment.
Algorithm 4 Non-Cooperative Game of Channel/Power Allo-
cation in IEEE 802.22
1: counter ← 0
2: choose one channel assignment uniformly at random
3: find the corresponding power vector
4: if this channel/power assignment is a NE then
5: return this NE
6: goto 19
7: end if
8: while counter < max counter do
9: for i = 1 : N do
10: counter ← counter + 1
11: assign the next channel to CRi
12: find the corresponding power vector
13: if this channel/power assignment is a NE then
14: return this NE
15: goto 19
16: end if
17: end for
18: end while
19: return counter
In Fig. 9 and 10, we look at the performance of the proposed
non-cooperative game in Section C. We run the algorithm 100
times. Fig. 9 shows the percentage of the times the game
converges versus the number of PUs.
As we see in some cases the proposed algorithm converges
with high probability. But in other cases the probability of
convergence is very small. In Fig. 10 we just consider the
times the game converges and we calculate the average of
convergence time. As we see in this figure, the game converges
almost quickly in all cases. We conclude that non-cooperative
algorithm may result in non-convergence or undesirable NE
point.
Fig. 9. percentage of the times the game converges versus number of PUs
Fig. 10. Average convergence time of the game versus number of PUs
